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This paper investigates the spatial organization and dynamics of retail markets using estab-
lishment level data on entry, exit, and location choice in the retail alcoholic beverage industry.
Establishments are classi¯ed into two groups based on ¯rm a±liation: chain vs. stand-alone
stores. Stand-alone stores are further broken down into two categories according to product
lines o®ered: diversi¯ed vs. specialized stores. The organization and dynamics of the vari-
ous groups di®er markedly. The number of chain stores per capita declines signi¯cantly with
market size, and these stores exhibit lower entry and exit rates in larger markets. This behav-
ior cannot be readily reconciled with the competitive industry theory. In contrast, both the
number per capita and the turnover rates of stand-alone stores are invariant to market size,
a behavior consistent with that of a competitive industry. These ¯ndings suggest a dominant
¯rms-competitive fringe organization as one potential characterization of retail markets.
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11 Introduction
In many retail markets, the brands of a particular good are typically available from various estab-
lishments that represent diverse approaches to business.1 An establishment can be a±liated with a
large ¯rm, or it can be an owner-operated store. In addition, an establishment can be diversi¯ed,
o®ering several di®erent products, or specialized, o®ering only a narrowly de¯ned set of products.
Given this diversity among establishments with respect to ¯rm a±liation and specialization, it is
natural to inquire how these di®erences matter for market organization and dynamics. Towards a
better understanding of these issues, this paper ¯rst lays out the basic facts about the cross-sectional
organization of markets: Does the composition of establishments vary systematically across markets
with market size, ¯xed costs, and other market characteristics? Second, entry and exit patterns
into local markets are investigated: Do entry and exit patterns di®er across establishment types?
If so, how are these turnover rates related to each other and do they vary across markets? This
paper provides empirical evidence on these issues using establishment level data on entry, exit, and
location choice in the retail alcoholic beverage industry. The ¯ndings broadly suggest that the
organization and dynamics of various establishment categories within a market di®er markedly.
The novel database used in this paper provides full coverage of all establishments licensed to
sell alcoholic beverages for o®-premise consumption in California during the years 1995-1998. The
data allows classi¯cation of establishments into several groups according to ¯rm a±liation and
product line specialization. Figure 1 presents the classi¯cation scheme. Based on ¯rm a±liation,
establishments are classi¯ed into two major groups. \Chain stores" contains all establishments
that are part of a national or local store chain. All other establishments are classi¯ed in the
category \stand-alone", which covers owner operated stores and stores that are owned by a ¯rm
that is not a parent of a chain. Stand-alone establishments are further broken down into two
categories: \diversi¯ed stores" that sell a range of products in addition to alcoholic beverages,
and \specialized stores" that primarily engage in alcohol retail. Chains are not further classi¯ed
based on specialization, because only a very small fraction of them are specialized in alcohol retail.
Although there is a growing literature that investigates the emergence of superstores and chains in
retailing, relatively little is known about the nature of competition between the di®erent categories
as classi¯ed here.2
1Throughout the paper, an establishment refers to a single store, as opposed to a ¯rm which may consist of one
or more stores. Also, the words establishment and store will be used interchangeably.
2See Bagwell, Ramey, and Spulber (1997), and Holmes (1999) for models that o®er explanations for the emergence
and growth of superstores in U.S. retailing.
2The static organization of establishment types across markets are analyzed based on alternative
theories' predictions regarding the change in the number of establishments with market size. In
the standard competitive industry theory, if consumers' demand is independent of the market size
as in Bresnahan and Reiss (1991), the number of establishments is proportional to market size (in
other words, establishments per capita is a constant). This is a consequence of the fact that the
price and sales of an establishment are independent of the number of competitors in the market.
If strategic behavior is important, as in many oligopolistic competition models, markups are not
invariant to the competitors, but rather fall as the number of competitors increase. As a result,
an establishment's sales has to expand with market size to cover ¯xed costs, and larger markets
are served by fewer establishments, leading to a decline in the number of establishments per capita
with increasing market size.3
These predictions may not exactly carry over to more speci¯c models, such as one where an
oligopoly of dominant establishments interacts with a competitive fringe. In fact, it is important
to understand how the predictions change when such a hybrid model is considered, because such
a model may potentially be representative for many retail markets where a small number of large
stores interact with a large number of small stores. In a simple vertically di®erentiated products
model, where one product is sold by identical Cournot oligopolists and the other by a perfectly
competitive fringe composed of identical, price taking establishments, it is demonstrated that the
number of both the oligopoly and the fringe establishments per capita decline with market size. The
rates of decline with market size, though, di®er across the two segments of the market. As market
size increases, the number of oligopolists per capita continues to decline, whereas the number of
fringe establishments per capita approaches a constant.
The relevance of these static predictions regarding the number of establishments per capita
are investigated using a sample of 218 cities with population larger than 25,000.4 The ¯ndings
suggest that, controlling for observables, the number of chain stores per capita declines signi¯cantly
with market size, whereas the number of stand-alone stores per capita is invariant to market size.
Overall, the number of establishments per capita declines with market size, although this decline is
less pronounced compared to the case of chains. This behavior is broadly consistent with the large
market behavior of the oligopoly-fringe model.
To complement and extend the characterization of the local markets' organization, this paper
3See also Campbell and Hopenhayn (1999) for a generic model where this is the case.
4While a market is identi¯ed to be a city, the shortcomings of doing so is clear. Consumers typically visit a
neighboring city for shopping. Nevertheless, the words `city' and `market' will be used interchangeably throughout
the paper.
3also looks at the di®erences in the patterns of entry and exit across establishment categories and
cities. While the full dynamics of the oligopoly-competitive fringe model is well beyond the scope of
the paper, the existing theories provide some guidance. Hopenhayn's (1992) competitive industry
dynamics model has clear predictions regarding the relation between market characteristics and the
turnover.5 In particular, under fairly general assumptions also satis¯ed by the competitive fringe in
the oligopoly-fringe model, both the entry and the exit rates should be invariant to market size in
a stationary equilibrium. The empirical analysis supports this prediction for the dynamic behavior
of stand-alone stores, but not for chain stores. Both the entry and exit rates decline with market
size for the latter category. In addition, stand-alone stores exhibit relatively high turnover across
markets compared to chains. The predictions of Hopenhayn's (1992) model about the impact of
other market characteristics (such as ¯xed costs and wages) on the turnover also seem to broadly
hold for stand-alone stores, but not for chains. Nevertheless, the evidence presented on these other
predictions is weaker in view of the fact that the variables used to measure market characteristics
are at best proxies for their actual counterparts. Future work with more precise measurement is
required for a deeper investigation of these predictions. There is also a need for further development
of dynamic models, such as Ericson and Pakes (1995), to understand the relation between market
characteristics and the dynamic behavior of chains as evidenced in this paper. In particular, models
that study the dynamic interaction between dominant ¯rms and a competitive fringe could help us
understand the patterns found here.
The analysis here contributes in two main ways to the existing literature on retail markets: First,
the heterogeneity among establishments is explicitly recognized. Second, dynamic, as well as static
patterns are documented. Both of these dimensions turn out to be important in understanding the
functioning of local markets. The results, neverthless, can be reconciled with the previous work.
Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) study small town retail and service markets and ¯nd that competitive
conduct in such markets do not change with entry once the market has two to three establishments.
Campbell and Hopenhayn (1999), in contrast, characterize the behavior of broadly de¯ned 2-digit
retail industries across large urban markets, and ¯nd that, in a majority of the industries, the
conduct changes with the addition of entrants even across large markets. The behavior of the
stand-alone stores observed here is broadly consistent with Bresnahan and Reiss (1991), in view of
the fact that they focus on industries where establishments are relatively homogenous and mostly
stand-alone. The pattern for chains and the industry as a whole is consistent with Campbell and
Hopenhayn (1999). While this consistency reinforces the interpretation that the chains' behavior
5Turnover, as used in this paper, refers to entry and exit together.
4is di®erent from that of a competitive industry, it also points to the importance of recognizing
heterogeneity: High-level industry aggregation may obscure the interesting patterns exhibited by
di®erent segments of the market.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the theories to motivate
the empirical work. The dataset used is described in Section 3, together with the details on the
institutional environment. Section 4 presents the results on the static organization of di®erent
establishment types across cities. Dynamic patterns are investigated in Section 5, followed by the
conclusion and directions for future work in Section 6.
2 Theories
This section has two objectives: First, static theories of competitive and imperfectly competitive
industries are analyzed with special emphasis on how the number of producers change across markets
with market characteristics, particularly with market size. Second, existing dynamic theories are
investigated to establish a link between market characteristics and turnover.
A competitive industry is characterized by a large number of identical, price taking establish-
ments. If consumers' demand is independent of the market size as in Bresnahan and Reiss (1991),
the number of establishments is proportional to market size (in other words, establishments per
capita is a constant), and the average establishment size is invariant to market size. These pre-
dictions remain valid under establishment heterogeneity and dynamic extensions that incorporate
entry and exit, as in Hopenhayn (1992).
When the industry is characterized by some type of imperfect competition, as in Cournot model
or Salop's (1979) circle model, these predictions are no longer valid. Common feature of these models
is that as the number of competitors increase with market size, markups fall, and an establishment's
sales has to increase to cover the ¯xed costs, assuming that the ¯xed costs do not change. As each
establishment gets larger, one should observe a less than proportional increase in the number of
establishments, or equivalently, a decline in the number of establishments per capita.
What happens if a group of dominant establishments and a competitive fringe interact in a
market? In particular, do the separate predictions about the pattern of establishments per capita
for competitive and imperfectly competitive models carry over to the hybrid model? The fact that
many local retail markets are composed of a few large stores and a large number of small stores
suggests that answers to these questions might be relevant in understanding the functioning of such
markets. The following is a simple model that investigates this possibility.
52.1 Cournot Oligopolists and Competitive Fringe
The model in this section considers explicitly the interaction between Cournot oligopolists and
a competitive fringe in a static setting. Consider a city with a continuum of S consumers. Each
consumer derives a marginal utility of ® from quality. The taste parameter ® is uniformly distributed
on the interval [®;®], where ® > 0 and ® ¡ ® = 1: Assume that each type ® is represented in the
city. A type ® consumer's utility from a product with quality µ and price p is given by
u(µ;®) = ®µ ¡ p
This utility function is frequently used in the vertically di®erentiated products literature.6
There are only two di®erent qualities of a product available in the city: The low quality product is
available from NO identical Cournot oligopolists, and its quality level is µO ( O stands for oligopoly).
The high quality product is provided by a competitive fringe of NF establishments, and its quality
level is µF ( F stands for fringe). To put this speci¯cation into context, one may imagine the
oligopolists as the superstores selling a standardized version of the good and providing low service,
and the competitive fringe as the specialized stores selling customized, brand-name versions of the
good and providing high service. Other interpretations are possible. For example, oligopolists might
be envisioned as stores located at a shopping center in the middle of the city, and specialized stores
as located at the periphery. µO and µF then correspond to the travel time, and ®, this time de¯ned
over [¡®;¡®]; is the marginal utility from reducing the travel time.
The demand for each quality is determined by the consumer type ®¤ who is indi®erent between
the two qualities available at prices pO and pF
®µF ¡ pF = ®µO ¡ pO
Solving for ® yields ®¤ = (pF ¡pO)=(µF ¡µO):7 Normalizing µF ¡µO = 1; it is easy to see that the
demand functions for both qualities are given by
DO(pO;pF) = S(pF ¡ pO ¡ ®)
DF(pF;pO) = S(® ¡ pF + pO)
Note that these demand functions are linear in prices and multiplicatively separable in market size
and an individual's demand.
6See, for example, Chapter 7 in Tirole (1988) and the references therein.
7Market coverage requires ®µO ¸ pO. It will soon be clear that the requirement is µO ¸ ®¡1(cO + f
1=2
O S¡1=2),
where cO and f
1=2
O are constants. Then the market is covered for all S ¸ 1 if we choose µO ¸ ®¡1(cO +f
1=2
O ): Here,
the choice of quality is not explicitly modelled and simply taken as given to ensure market coverage.
6The oligopolists and fringe establishments simultaneously choose their output to maximize prof-
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where QO is the total output of the oligopoly sector and cO is the marginal cost common to all
oligopolists. For the moment assume that pF ¡ ® ¡ cO > 0; for the optimal choice of output to be
strictly positive. Later on, this will yield a restriction on admissible cost structures of the oligopoly
and the fringe.
From the maximization problem, the output for an oligopolist is obtained as q¤
O = S(pF ¡ ® ¡








There is free entry into the oligopoly, which ensures that, in equilibrium, ¼¤
O = fO; wherefO is the
¯xed cost for an oligopolist. Together with (1), this condition will yield N¤
O; the equilibrium number
of oligopolists: Before that, the behavior of the fringe and the price pF needs to be determined.






Together with the ¯xed costs of production, fF; the cost structure of a fringe establishments is
the standard U-shaped one. Under this speci¯cation, the optimal output is q¤
F = pF=2cF; and
the maximized pro¯t is ¼¤
F = p2
F=4cF: As in the oligopoly case, free entry into the fringe requires
¼¤
F = fF. Free entry condition immediately determines the fringe price as p¤
F = 2(cFfF)1=2: This
price is invariant to city size S; and depends only on the cost structure of the fringe. Given this
price, the output of a fringe establishment is given by q¤
F = (fF=cF)1=2; which is also invariant to
city size.
The total output of the fringe depends on the output of the oligopoly, and this is the crucial
link between the two sectors. Given p¤
F; the equilibrium number of oligopolists can be calculated
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where it is assumed that 2(cFfF)1=2 ¡ ® ¡ cO > 0; to ensure the nonnegativity of N¤
O: This is also
the requirement for an oligopolist's optimal output to be strictly positive as mentioned earlier. It
7is easy to see that N¤
O is increasing less than proportionally with S: The number of oligopolists per
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and it declines with S:8 This contrasts with the fringe price, which is a constant. As the city gets
larger, the price of the oligopoly declines because of lower markups due to tougher competition. An
implication is that the relative price of the high quality good increases with city size.















which increases in S: From this, the output of the fringe can be obtained as
Q
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where it is assumed that cO + ® ¡ 2(cFfF)1=2 > 0, to ensure the nonnegativity of the output for
all market sizes. Note that the fringe output also increases in S: Thus, market expansion increases
output in both sectors. This market expansion e®ect is represented by S outside the brackets in both
output equations. There is also a substitution e®ect: as market size increases, both the absolute
and the relative price of the low quality good decreases, which causes an increasing proportion of
consumers to switch to the low quality good. This e®ect is represented by the terms in brackets
in both output expressions. Therefore, the oligopoly output per capita increases with market size,
while the fringe output per capita decreases. Finally, the number of fringe establishments per capita












As themodel stands, the number of oligopolists per capita is declining for S > (4=f
¡2
O (2(cFfF)1=2¡
® ¡ cO)2); and the number of fringe establishments per capita is declining for all S > 0. The rates
of decline, however, are di®erent. It is worth considering how the number of establishments per
capita behave in large markets, in view of the fact that the empirical work deals with relatively
large cities, at least compared to the small towns in Bresnahan and Reiss (1991).9 Note that the
8Note also that this price ensures market coverage as required in footnote 7.
9The smallest city studied here has approximately 3 times the largest town's population in their sample.
8leading term in (2) is the ¯rst term. The second term approaches to zero with S. On the other
hand, the leading term in (3) is the ¯rst term, and the second term becomes quickly negligible as
S increases. This suggests that the large market behavior for oligopolists and fringe establishments
per capita should di®er from each other.
Using the expressions for establishments per capita in (2) and (3), the share of total establish-

























Note that as a result of the di®erent convergence rates of (2) and (3), the shares in (4) and (5) also
have di®erent convergence rates. It is easy to verify that, as market size increases, the share of total
establishments in the fringe approaches 1, whereas the share in the oligopoly goes to 0:
Depending on the cost structure, di®erent patterns can be obtained for the functions in (2), (3),
(4), and (5). Figure 2 displays the simulated number of establishments per capita and share of total
establishments in each sector under di®erent scenarios for the industry's cost structure. The market
size range is chosen to be S = 10 to 100,000, and the lowest type consumer's marginal utility is
set to ® = 0:001: The plots are in logarithms so that the slopes of the curves are elasticities. As
market size increases, establishments per capita in the oligopoly sector declines and the elasticity
with respect to the market size asymptotes to ¡1=2.10 The number of fringe establishments per
capita declines and levels o® with market size, and the elasticity approaches zero. Also, the share
of total establishments in the fringe approaches 1 (its logarithm approaches 0), and the share in the
oligopoly approaches to zero (its logarithm decreases to ¡1).
While the model presented is special in many respects, the predictions remain valid when we
consider alternative modelling strategies for the sectors in the market. For example, one can model
the fringe as a monopolistically competitive sector, producing di®erentiated goods. In addition,
Salop's (1979) circle model can be used to model the oligopoly. The empirical implications of these
di®erent combinations are essentially the same.
10The magnitude of this elasticity depends on the sensitivity of variable pro¯ts to the number of competitors.
While it is ¡1=2 for the particular model considered, it will in general be some negative.
92.2 Connection to Empirical Work
Equations (2), (3), (4) and (5) are functions of market size; costs, and the marginal utility. Although
not explicitly incorporated into the model, the utility parameter ® will in general be a function of an
individual consumer's characteristics, such as tastes and income. Therefore, demographic di®erences
across cities can have an impact on the number of establishments per capita and the share of total
establishments for a given category. Thus, for a given establishment category j; any of the equations





where gj(¢) is any function, Sc is the market size as before, and xc is a vector of city-speci¯c
variables that account for costs and tastes. The right hand side variable yj
c is either the number
of establishments per capita, or the share of total establishments. For the empirical analysis, the











The variables in xc are either in logarithm or level, depending on the de¯nition of the variable, as
will be discussed later. The primary coe±cient of interest in (7) is ¯j: If the log-linear speci¯cation
is not grossly at odds with the data, then the competitive model predicts ¯j = 0; while an imperfect
competition model would predict ¯j < 0: The oligopoly-competitive fringe model has the implication
that, for large markets, ¯j = 0 for the fringe and ¯j < 0 for the oligopoly.
The empirical analysis looks at a cross-section of cities to infer, using (7), whether any of the
predictions discussed in this section regarding the number of establishments is valid for the industry
studied. Note that, while the oligopoly in the model is associated with the large, chain stores and the
fringe with the small, stand-alone stores, empirical work proceeds without any such presumption.
Ultimately, patterns in the data will determine which sector behaves what way.
2.3 Dynamics
There is no theoretical work that considers the full dynamics of a dominant ¯rms - competitive
fringe model, such as the one presented above. One strand of the literature focuses on the inter-
action of a monopolist and a competitive fringe, such as Holmes (1996), and Berck and Perlo®
(1988). While these models are appropriate for small town markets where one dominant estab-
lishment interacts with small establishments, they are not informative about larger markets, where
10typically a group of dominant establishments interacts with a competitive fringe. Moreover, neither
of the models provide a comprehensive framework that allows comparative statics regarding market
characteristics. The development of such a dynamic model is beyond the scope of this paper, but
is an important future research area.
There are mainly two approaches to the theory of industry dynamics in the literature: one
that considers perfectly competitive industries, such as Jovanovic (1982), Hopenhayn (1992), and
Jovanovic and MacDonald (1994), and the other that deals with a more general class of industries,
including the imperfectly competitive ones, notably Pakes and McGuire (1994), and Ericson and
Pakes (1995). The common element in these models is the establishment heterogeneity, which is
summarized by a random productivity parameter that evolves over time to shape establishment
dynamics.
In Hopenhayn's (1992) model, establishments maximize their expected discounted pro¯ts over
time given perfect anticipation of the industry aggregates and the stochastic process the productivity
parameter follows. Entry takes place whenever a potential entrant can make non-negative pro¯ts net
of entry costs. Exit occurs whenever an incumbent's productivity level falls below an exit threshold
and the establishment can no longer sustain non-negative pro¯ts net of ¯xed costs incurred every
period. Under the conditions that the industry is a price taker in the input markets and the pro¯t
function of an establishment is separable in its productivity parameter and market prices, the model
exhibits a unique stationary equilibrium where the number of ¯rms, aggregate output, input and
output prices, exit threshold, and the number of entrants are constant over time. Of interest here is
the comparative statics of the turnover rates with respect to market characteristics in the stationary
equilibrium. The main predictions of the model are as follows:
i) Entry and exit rates do not vary with market size,
ii) An increase in ¯xed costs leads to an increase in exit rate and a decrease in entry rate,
iii) An increase in entry costs decreases both entry and exit rates,
iv) Entry and exit rates are invariant to a change in the exogenously given wage rate.
Caution must be exercised in exploring the relevance of these predictions in a cross-section
of markets. Clearly, the assumptions underlying these predictions are restrictive. Stationarity is
an important restriction by itself. If some markets experience persistent growth or decline, the
validity of the predictions is questionable. In addition, the setup described above leaves out some
interesting possibilities such as a systematic change across markets in the productivity of entrants.
If, for example, larger markets attract potential entrants with higher than average productivity, we
might observe higher entry rates in larger markets, even in the presence of larger entry costs and
11¯xed costs. The empirical analysis discusses these concerns in more detail.
The competitive theory ignores any post-entry strategic interaction between establishments.
Ericson and Pakes (1995) is a pioneer work on the dynamics of industries where establishments
do not behave competitively. In their model, an establishment's dynamic pro¯t maximization
problem depends on the distribution of its rivals' productivity levels. An establishment's survival
is determined not only by changes in its own productivity through active investment (such as
R&D), but also by the evolution of its rivals' productivities and by market characteristics. Thus,
their framework allows for `toughness' of rivals to in°uence the dynamics of an establishment.
Unfortunately, though, their model does not provide any straightforward theoretical predictions
regarding the impact of market characteristics. These predictions might depend on the assumed type
of imperfect competition in the markets, and more work is required towards obtaining predictions
for a general class of models. The empirical work in this paper is a preliminary step towards
understanding these impacts' nature.
The competitive fringe in the oligopoly - fringe model presented earlier satis¯es all the assump-
tions about the industry structure studied in Hopenhayn (1992).11 Therefore one may expect the
dynamics of the fringe to be in line with his model, while the dynamic behavior of the oligopoly is
likely to be di®erent, but no clear predictions are available. One important goal of the empirical
work in this paper is then to document the di®erences in the dynamics of the various sectors in the
market.
3 Data and Institutional Environment
The main database used in this paper comes directly from the records of California Department of
Alcoholic Beverage Control (DABC), the state authority responsible for enforcing alcoholic beverage
regulations and maintaining records of alcoholic beverage manufacturing and distribution licenses.
Because of the legal requirements, the data is highly reliable and covers all licensed establishments.
Below, a brief summary is provided regarding the institutional details about the organization of
retail alcohol industry in California, followed by a detailed look at the dataset's contents.
11Although the establishments in the fringe are homogenous, the results do not change when heterogenity is
introduced as in Hopenhayn (1992).
123.1 Institutional Environment
California is one of the 32 license states in which alcoholic beverages are produced, distributed and
sold by private enterprises holding state-issued licenses. In this paper, the focus is only on those
establishments that sell alcoholic beverages for o®-premise consumption. These establishments are
classi¯ed under `o®-sale general' category according to the license coding system of the DABC. All
types of alcoholic beverages, i.e. beer, wine, and distilled spirits, can be sold under this license. The
application fee for such a license was $12,000 as of 1998, regardless of the location of the premise
for which the license is intended. The issue of a license is subject to passing a thorough inspection
of the applicant's background (e.g. criminal record), and the prospective premise's suitability (e.g.
proximity to residences). If a license is granted, it has to be renewed every year at a fee, which, as
of 1998, amounted to $350 - about 3% of the application fee. This fee does not depend on the sales
of an establishment, unlike a wine or beer manufacturer's license which is subject to an annual fee
depending on the production volume, and unlike an on-sale license, where the annual fee depends
on the population of the city. Thus, in o®-sale retail, each establishment faces the same legal fees
for operation regardless of the location and sales volume. Licenses can be transferred from premise
to premise, or from one licensee to the other at the same premise. Each such transfer involves a
new application fee, and the issue of a new license. Transfers are common in this industry. One
obvious reason for this is that an already established premise with a license is unlikely to be denied
for a new license.
Before 1978, there were important restrictions on pricing in the industry. Retailers had to be
involved in fair contracts, which prevented them to sell any brand they carry at a price lower than
what was previously ¯led with the state by a competitor selling the same or a close substitute
within the same geographic area de¯ned by the regulatory authority. After successful challenges by
retailers that this practice was against antitrust laws, such restrictions are no longer in e®ect since
1978 by a California Supreme Court rule. The deregulation brought about a shakeout and changes
in the size distribution of establishments. The evolution of the industry structure after deregulation
is further investigated in Campbell and Dinlersoz (1999).
While prices are no longer regulated, there is one important regulation that can potentially
a®ect the analysis here. There are county-wide restrictions on entry to alcohol retail business: for
o®-sale general retail, the number of establishments per capita in a county is regulated to be no
more than one per 2,500 inhabitants. When this restriction is non-binding for a county, the county
attains the unconstrained equilibrium number of establishments. When this restriction is binding,
however, entry is not possible even if it is pro¯table, and the unconstrained equilibrium number of
13establishments is not attained. In this case, the regulation can also indirectly a®ect exit by main-
taining higher than free entry equilibrium pro¯ts for incumbents. It turns out, however, that such
restrictions are rarely binding. Figure 3 displays how actual number of establishments per capita
compares with the regulatory limit for all 58 counties in California at the beginning of 1998. Note
that the regulatory limit is not exactly a straight line (level at log(1=2500)), because the regulations
allow for an additional establishment when a city's population exceeds an integer multiple of 2500
by a fraction. An analysis of the establishments per capita by county for 1998 (as well as each
year from 1994 to 1997) reveals that many counties have far less number of establishments than
the maximum number allowed, and this behavior is more pronounced for more populated counties.
This is a direct result of the fact that establishments per capita is declining across counties with
population as con¯rmed by the regression curves in the ¯gure. For many small counties, though, the
regulatory limit is exceeded. There are several reasons for this. First, the alcoholic beverages code
allows for additional establishments beyond the regulatory limit, if an entrepreneur can successfully
argue that substantial public interest will be served. Second, the code states that no active license
can be cancelled if it was already in e®ect at the time the restrictions on the number of establish-
ments is imposed and/or revised. This also covers the case where a county's population shrinks
and, consequently, the limit on establishments per capita declines.
Figures 4 and 5 display the pattern of establishments per capita across cities, for all cities
and for cities with population greater or equal to 25,000, respectively. This paper considers only
the cities with a population of at least 25,000 in 1990 due to non-availability of data on several
demographic characteristics for smaller cities. All of these cities are located in those counties for
which the number of establishments are far below the restrictions. Also, entry and exit during
1994-1998 period did not cause any of the counties in the analysis to reach the regulatory limit for
establishments per capita.
The patterns in Figures 4 and 5 are already somewhat suggestive about the organization of the
industry across cities. The simple bivariate linear regression (OLS) and least absolute deviation
(LAD) regression in logarithms both produce signi¯cantly negative coe±cients for population, indi-
cating a decline in establishments per capita with market size. However, most of this decline occurs
relatively over the range of medium sized cities, and the decline is much less perceptible for larger
cities. Nonparametric regression using a kernel estimator con¯rms this behavior. For the sample
of cities with population at least 25,000 the decline is still signi¯cant, but much less in magnitude.
Detailed analysis of the change in establishments per capita across cities is deferred to following
sections.
143.2 Classi¯cation of Establishments
For each establishment, the data provides the license number, exact premise address including
county, city, zipcode and street information, entry date, exit date, and the type of the establishment.
No information on sales or output is available. The type of the establishment is identi¯ed by the ¯rm
a±liation information and the type of business the establishment is in. While many classi¯cation
schemes are possible using this information, this paper uses a simple approach for brevity. The
classi¯cation scheme is pictured in Figure 1. An establishment is included in the chain category,
if it is part of a national chain (such as Albertsons Inc., Longs Drugs, Rite Aid, or Safeway Inc.),
or a local chain based in California (such as Beverages and More, Stater Bros., Super A Foods,
or Raleys). The identities of chain stores' parent ¯rms in the data were also veri¯ed using several
internet resources and trade journals. All the remaining establishments are included in the stand-
alone category, which contains all other store types, mostly mom-and-pop stores. Stand-alone
stores are further broken down into two categories based on whether their principal line of business
is liquor retail (the category named specialized), or they sell other products as well (the category
named diversi¯ed). The former category includes all stores that report its main business as liquor
retail. The latter category is an eclectic group that includes grocery stores, deli stores, food markets,
etc. An overwhelming majority of chain stores is diversi¯ed (only 27 out of 2931 chain stores in 1998
were specialized in alcohol retail), so chain stores are not further classi¯ed based on specialization.
The classi¯cation is done using a series of dummy variables. Table 1 summarizes these variables.
At the establishment level, the only other variable is the age, which is the number of years an
establishment has been in alcohol retail business. Age is calculated by the di®erence between the
year of analysis, 1998, and the license issue year.
3.3 City Characteristics
The main geographic unit of analysis in this paper is a city. Clearly, city boundaries need not
coincide with the spatial extent of the local market for establishments in the city. Methods for
identifying the spatial extent of competition are in their infancy, and generally require data on prices.
For example, Pinkse, Slade and Brett (1997) use prices posted by gasoline stations to estimate the
cross-price response coe±cients and determine the spatial extent of competition. Unfortunately,
such methods are not applicable to the data here, as there is no price information available.
The data for 1998 is used to study the static organization of establishment categories and the
turnover patterns. Variables that are used to describe city characteristics are summarized in Table 2.
15Table 3 and 4 present the descriptive statistics and correlations for these variables. These variables
come from a diverse set of sources, which are indicated in the table. Some of the listed variables are
available only for the year 1990. Since the main goal here is to capture cross-sectional di®erences
across cities, rather than any time series aspects, the 1990 counterparts should be useful as long as
the cross-sectional di®erences in these variables persist over time.
The market size is measured by the number of residents aged 21 and over, that is, the drinking
age population in a city.12 A set of variables are used to control for demographic di®erences across
cities that may a®ect demand for alcoholic beverages, such as race composition, and income. Also,
to control for variable and ¯xed costs of establishments, wage and rent are included. Wage is
available at the county level for 1996. The median house rent is only a proxy for the actual cost
of store space. In fact, one would like to have a measure of average rent per square foot of store
space in a city, but no such variable is available. It should also be noted that wage and rent also
vary across di®erent establishment groups in the sample. It would be too optimistic to expect that
di®erent establishment categories pay the same wage and rent. Unfortunately, a ¯ner breakdown
of these two variables by establishment type is not available.
3.4 Construction of Entry and Exit Figures
Entry into the industry is de¯ned as obtaining a license and starting alcohol retail business at
a premise. For specialized establishments with main business in liquor, entry means starting a
new business entity. For other establishments, entry means starting a product line, and does not
necessarily correspond to a new business overall. The original license issue year allows us to track
the entry of each establishment. Entry can occur either at a new premise or at a previously existing
premise via license transfer. License renewals at the same premise are not considered as entry, but
license transfers that result in a change of ownership and/or premise are, because the new license
holder corresponds to a new entrepreneur that does not necessarily have the same approach to
business and represents a di®erent managerial talent, even at the same location. Upon a transfer,
the transferred license is automatically cancelled, and the new establishment is assigned a new
license number.
Exit from the industry is de¯ned as a voluntary cancellation or surrender of a license and dis-
continuation of business at a premise. While exit corresponds to a total business shutdown for
specialized establishments, it means discontinuing a product line for others, and does not necessar-
12Including residents with ages 17 to 20 in the market de¯nition did not yield substantially di®erent results in the
analysis to follow.
16ily correspond to exit from other product lines. On the other hand, exit of a chain or diversi¯ed
establishment might result in exit from an otherwise pro¯table alcohol retail business. Unfortu-
nately, no identi¯cation is available for such exits. As in entry, license transfers are considered as
exit, if ownership changes. License revocations due to violations of the alcohol retail codes are not
considered as exits, because they do not represent voluntary shutdowns. Such instances are rare
and account only for a minuscule portion of the turnover (approximately less than 0.5% of all exits
are license revocations).
4 Organization of Establishment Types across Cities
Towards understanding the di®erences between di®erent establishment types, this section empir-
ically characterizes the organization of the retail alcohol industry across cities by category. The
results are interpreted based on the predictions regarding the number of establishments per capita
and share of total establishments discussed earlier.
4.1 Composition of Establishments
Table 5 provides descriptive statistics for the share of total establishments by di®erent establishment
types at the beginning of 1998. A majority of the establishments are stand-alone stores, and most of
those stores are specialized in alcohol retail. Chains and specialized establishments are represented
in all 218 cities, and there are no diversi¯ed stores in 15 cities in the sample. This does not mean
that there is no grocery stores or deli stores in those cities, but just that there are no such stores
o®ering alcohol as part of their product lines.
What determines this diverse pattern of establishment composition across cities? In particular,
how do market characteristics a®ect this composition? In a simple OLS framework following the
speci¯cation in (7), Table 6 gives an idea on these issues.13 In all regressions, the dependent variable
is the logarithm (in base 10) of the share of total establishments in a given category, and the
regressors enter in logs except for fraction of population that is nonwhite.14 In the interpretation of
13Least Absolute Deviation (LAD) regressions were also run without a change in the conclusions.
14In the interpretation of the results, it should be noted that for chains, the location choices of a parent ¯rm's
establishments in di®erent cities are likely to be interdependent. This is because the parent ¯rm would choose to
locate those establishments in order to maximize the joint pro¯t, and the distance between any two stores of a parent
¯rm will re°ect this. This may be important for both intra- and inter-city location patterns. These issues are ignored
here, for the sake of obtaining a simple, preliminary look at the organization of markets.
17the results, it should be noted that for chains, the location choices of a parent ¯rm's establishments
in di®erent cities are likely to be interdependent. This is because the parent ¯rm would probably
choose to locate those establishments in order to maximize the joint pro¯t, and the distance between
any two stores of a parent ¯rm will re°ect those decisions. This may be important for both intra-
and inter-city location patterns. These issues are ignored here, for the sake of obtaining a simple,
preliminary look at the organization of markets.
The results in Table 6 reveal that stand-alone stores constitute an increasing share of total
establishments as drinking age population in a city increases. The reverse result holds for chain
stores. The coe±cient for chains suggest that there is approximately a 0.04% decline in the share
of chain stores with a 1% increase in market size. This is accompanied by a 0.03% increase in the
share of stand-alone establishments, although the coe±cient is not highly signi¯cant. It seems like
specialized stores account for most of this increase, and the share of diversi¯ed stores is virtually
invariant to market size. These coe±cient estimates seem to be grossly in line with the Cournot
oligopolists - competitive fringe model discussed earlier.
Other regressors also contribute to the change in the share of establishments across cities in
important ways. Chains stores constitute a lower share of establishments where fraction of nonwhite
residents is higher, and the reverse holds for stand-alone stores. In addition, share of chains increases
with income, while share of stand-alone stores decreases. The coe±cient is not highly signi¯cant for
chains, but has a relatively high magnitude, compared to market size's impact. Also, the negative
association between income and share of stand-alone stores is again mostly driven by specialized
stores, and the magnitude and signi¯cance is relatively high.
Share of neither chains nor stand-alone establishments change signi¯cantly with wage. However,
when diversi¯ed and specialized stores are considered separately, wage seems to have a large and
signi¯cant impact on the share, with opposite signs for the two categories. The impact of wage is
more signi¯cant for diversi¯ed stores than for specialized ones. It is also interesting to note that rent
seems to have a negative but insigni¯cant coe±cient for chains. The coe±cient is also insigni¯cant
for stand-alone stores overall, but, as in wage, its impact is substantially di®erent and signi¯cant
for specialized and diversi¯ed stores. The regressors altogether explain about 10 to 30 percent of
variation in the shares across cities, the poorest ¯t being for diversi¯ed stores.
In general, the results reveal important di®erences in the composition of markets across cities.
The share of chains decreases signi¯cantly with market size, and the share of stand-alone stores
increases, although this increase is not highly signi¯cant.
184.2 Establishments per Capita
Table 7 contains the results from OLS regressions based again on (7).15 The dependent variable is
the establishments per drinking age resident expressed in logarithm (base 10), and the regressors
are in the same format as in the previous section. The ¯rst notable feature is that the coe±cient
of market size is signi¯cant and negative for chains, but fails to be so for other categories. The
coe±cient for chains indicates that there is about a 0.10% decline in number of chain stores per
capita with a 1% increase in drinking age population. The decline for all establishments is much less
in magnitude. This is probably because the decline in chains per capita is masked by the relative
invariance of stand-alone stores per capita with respect to market size. Again, at a broad level, this
¯nding is consistent with the oligopoly - fringe model's predictions for large cities.
Regarding the appropriateness of separate OLS regressions there is one important point: since
di®erent establishment types compete within the same city-market, the error terms are likely to
be correlated across regressions. Hence, a seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) framework is
appropriate for joint tests on the coe±cients of interest. Coe±cient estimates are the same for
both separate OLS estimations and the SUR estimation. Table 7 contains the Breusch-Pagan test
statistic for independence of residuals across regressions. The test strongly rejects the independence
of error terms. Note also that the test for the joint signi¯cance of market size's coe±cients across
regressions also rejects the hypothesis that market size does not matter for establishments for capita.
This result appears to be driven by the pattern exhibited by chain stores.
Observe also that overall establishments per capita is declining sharply with income, but this
seems to be driven mostly by stand-alone stores, in particular, by specialized stores. Also, estab-
lishments per capita is negatively associated with nonwhite population and rent, and positively
associated with wage. None of these coe±cients are signi¯cant, though. Again, there are di®erences
in the impacts of these variables across categories. Wage is signi¯cant only for diversi¯ed stores, and
has a relatively large positive coe±cient. For chains and specialized stores, the impact of wage is
negative, but not signi¯cant. Finally, note that there are less chains and diversi¯ed stores per capita
in high rent cities, but more specialized stores, although the coe±cients in chains and specialized
stores regressions are not signi¯cant.
The ¯ndings on the coe±cients of market size in these regressions, together with the results in
the previous section, seem to broadly suggest that the industry's organization is in line with the
oligopoly - competitive fringe model.
15Again, Least Absolute Deviation (LAD) regressions were also run without a change in the conclusions.
194.3 Robustness
To re¯ne the baseline empirical results discussed to this point, additional regressors were added to
the analysis. These account for other concerns that were not addressed in the theory and empirical
sections.
Substitution E®ects from Other Industries. One potential concern is the substitution
e®ects, if any, from \on-sale" establishments, such as restaurant and bars. If, as cities get larger,
more and more people eat and drink out, rather than buying packaged liquor, then this may be one
explanation why there are less chain stores per capita in larger cities. This argumant, though, leaves
unexplained why stand-alone stores are not a®ected the same way. Nevertheless, to check for the
possible impact, the sales per capita (in logs) in eating and drinking places16 was added as a regressor
in both the static and dynamic analysis. In establishment per capita regressions, this variable turns
out to have a signi¯cant, positive coe±cient for stand-alone, specialized, and diversi¯ed stores, but
turns out to be insigni¯cant for chain stores. Moreover, the conclusions about the impact of market
size does not change after controlling for this variable. As an alternative, sales per capita was
used as a dependent variable, and there is no indication that there is a signi¯cant increase in this
variable as city size increases. Also, the conclusions of the dynamic analysis did not change when
this variable was added.
Neighborhood E®ects. Another concern is related to the possibility that the variable income
is indeed acting as a proxy for neighborhood quality. In fact, coe±cients indicate that there are
signi¯cantly less specialized stores per capita in cities with higher median family income. There may
be two reasons for this: establishments may be larger in high income places, or poor neighborhoods
have more establishments. If the quality of the neighborhood is an omitted variable highly correlated
with income and income is highly correlated with market size, then there is potentially an omitted
variable bias on the coe±cient of market size. However, note from table 4 that income and market
size (POP*AGE21O) has a correlation of only -0.03. This alleviates omitted variable bias concerns.
Nevertheless, controls for neighborhood quality, such as crime rate (serious crimes per capita known
to police) and percent of families with income below poverty level,17 were added as regressors. None
of these variables alter the ¯ndings regarding the impact of market size.
Religion Composition. Another variable was added to control for the impact of religious
practices on the results. This variable is the fraction of people in a county that are full members of
16This variable is available from CSA.
17Both variables are available from CCDB.
20a religious group.18 Again, the results for market size was robust to the inclusion of this variable.
5 Dynamics of the Industry
This section deals with the dynamics of the industry, which complements and extends the analysis in
the previous section. The main focus is on the cross-sectional di®erences in the patterns of turnover
across cities and establishment types. Time series aspects are left for future work. The analysis
¯rst considers the general pattern of turnover across cities during 1995-1998, and then delves into
di®erences across establishment categories in the patterns and determinants of turnover.
5.1 The General Pattern
Entry and exit rates for an establishment category in a city during year t are de¯ned using the
following convention
Entry (Exit) Rate =
Number of establishments that enter (exit) during year t
Number of establishments active at the beginning of year t
(8)
This de¯nition is similar to the one used by Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson (1988). Unlike
in their work, though, the rates here are de¯ned by establishment category, rather than for all
establishments pooled. This approach is superior here because the pool of potential entrants and
exiting establishments depend on how each category is represented in the sample.
The statewide evolution of the entry and exit rates for all establishments pooled is shown in
Figure 6. The industry exhibits a decline in entry rate and an increase in exit rate during this period.
Entry rate levels o® after 1996. Exit rate increases between 1996 and 1997, and somewhat stabilizes
between 1997 and 1998. As result, there was a negative net entry during 1997 and 1998. Overall,
the industry experienced a slight decline in the number of establishments during the 1995-1998
period (about 5% compared to the beginning of 1995).
How di®erent are the entry and exit rates of di®erent establishment types during that period?
Table 8 provides summary statistics for entry and exit rates across cities by type. The reported
rates are time averages. While diversi¯ed stores exhibit a net entry during the period, chains and
specialized stores exhibit a net exit. The di®erence between entry and exit rates for each category is
signi¯cant as evidenced by the t-statistics from pairwise comparison of means across cities. Chains
exhibit the lowest entry rate, and diversi¯ed stores have the highest entry rate during the period.
18This variable was contructed from the data in Bradley, et al. Churches and Church Membership in the United
States, 1990.
21The lowest exit rate, on the other hand, is exhibited by chain stores, and the highest by specialized
stores. While not reported in the table, the pairwise di®erences in entry rates for chains and
stand-alone stores are signi¯cant, as well as the di®erences in exit rates. Specialized and diversi¯ed
stores appear to be a high turnover segment of the market, whereas chains exhibit a relatively low
turnover.
How are entry and exit patterns of di®erent establishment types related? Tables 9 and 10
present simple correlations for entry and exit rates across categories. Table 9 suggests that chains'
entry rate is negatively correlated with entry rate of stand-alone stores, in particular, with that of
specialized stores, although the magnitudes are not too high. There is also a positive but small
correlation between entry rates of chains and diversi¯ed stores, as well as between diversi¯ed and
specialized stores.
Turning to the exit rates in Table 10, note that exit rates for stand-alone stores and specialized
stores are negatively correlated with the exit rate of chains. In addition, there is a slight positive
correlation between exit rates of chains and diversi¯ed stores. The correlation between diversi¯ed
and specialized stores' exit rates is relatively high and positive.
Finally, Table 11 presents correlations of entry rates with exit rates. First note that, reading
o® the principal diagonal, entry and exit rates for all types are highly positively correlated with
each other. This positive correlation is much more pronounced for stand-alone stores, especially for
specialized stores. The other noticeably high correlation is between diversi¯ed stores' entry rate
and specialized stores' exit rate. Entry rate for specialized stores is also negatively correlated with
exit rate of chains, and chains' entry rate is slightly negatively correlated with exit rate of stand-
alone stores, in particular, with that of diversi¯ed stores. Specialized stores' entry rate is positively
correlated with the exit rate of diversi¯ed stores, and the magnitude of this correlation is relatively
high.
In general, one should be cautious about reading too much into the patterns presented in this
section, because these correlations do not necessarily re°ect any causality between entry and exit
rates, and a number of factors, such as city demographics, can account for them. The following
sections analyze in more detail the di®erences across establishment types and cities in turnover rates.
Nevertheless, the important results from the correlation analysis can be summarized as follows:
(a) For each establishment type, cities with higher entry rate tend to be the cities with higher
exit rate as well,
(b) Cities with higher entry (exit) rates of chains tend to exhibit lower entry (exit) rates of
specialized stores, although these correlations are not strong,
22(c) Cities with higher entry rate of diversi¯ed stores tend to have higher exit rates for
specialized stores. The reverse relationship also holds, but is much weaker,
(d) Chains' entry rate is not highly correlated with stand-alone stores' exit rate, and vice
versa.
These results suggest that turnover rates are much more correlated within categories than across
categories. Of course, these are based on contemporaneous correlations and the pattern for cor-
relations over time is also important. Entry into a market may not lead to changes in entry and
exit patterns in that market on impact, but may do so over a period of time. Such investigations
are not the focus of this paper, as stated before, and is left to future work. In what follows, the
cross-sectional determinants of exit and entry are further investigated using city level co-variates.
This is done by focusing on 1998, the year for which the static analysis was carried out earlier. The
results were repeated for other years in the sample as well, without a substantial change in the main
¯ndings.
5.2 Exit
This section provides a detailed look at the determinants of exit across cities for di®erent establish-
ment categories. Given the sharp di®erences in the organization of di®erent establishment categories
across cities, one expects discrepancies in their dynamic behavior as well.
Suppose that the expected future discounted pro¯t, vic; of an establishment i in a given city
c is a function of a vector of establishment speci¯c features, zi and a vector of general market
characteristics, xc; which includes market size, variable, and ¯xed costs
vic = v(zi;xc)
Exit of an establishment is equivalent to saying that it is not pro¯table to continue operation
given the establishment characteristics and market environment, i.e. vic < 0: If one denotes the
exit event with an indicator Xic that takes a value of 1 if establishment i in city c exits within
the period of analysis, and 0 otherwise, then one can associate the event of exit to the event of
being non-pro¯table, i.e. Xic = 1 , vic < 0: Then, the probabilities associated with the two events
are the same, i.e. P(Xic = 1) = P(vic < 0): Now, suppose that the probability of exit is a linear
function of the observables zi and xc; and, an establishment and city speci¯c error term "ic




c° + "ic (9)
23where "ic is allowed to be correlated with "jc if establishments i and j are located in the same city
c. In addition, if the error term "ic is assumed to have a logistic distribution, then the parameter
vector £ = f¯;°g in equation (9) can be estimated by maximum likelihood using as the dependent
variable the exit indicator Xic.19 The covariance matrix under the assumed error structure is
estimated based on White (1982).
As before, the regressors are in logs except for the fraction nonwhite and establishment age.20
A control variable for population growth (POPGRO) during 1998 is also added. It is important
to control for growth because the predictions discussed earlier assume stationarity. The results
are given in Table 12. The ¯rst column does the analysis for all establishments grouped, and
dummies are added to control for establishment type. The omitted category is chains. Note that
this speci¯cation constrains the coe±cients for market variables to be the same across categories.
The remaining columns reports separate estimation results for each category.
Overall, exit probability declines signi¯cantly with establishment age, but this e®ect is more
pronounced for specialized stores. Age does not seem to matter for chain stores at all, and it is
not highly signi¯cant for diversi¯ed stores. One potential explanation for this might be that chains
tend to be larger establishments, and age for such establishments may not matter much on top of
the size's impact on survival. On the other hand, the importance of age for specialized stores might
re°ect some `tougher selection' e®ect in the sense that such stores may need longer time until they
establish themselves pro¯tably at a location. Further work and data are needed to address these
possibilities.
Exit probability also declines with market size when all establishments are pooled, although the
e®ect is not highly signi¯cant. This e®ect is much stronger for chains and diversi¯ed stores (highly
signi¯cant only for chains), but not for specialized stores. The relative invariance of the exit rate
for stand-alone stores, and in particular, for specialized stores, is consistent with the predictions of
Hopenhayn's (1992) model for a competitive industry. This does not seem to be the case for chains.
The growth variable is uniformly insigni¯cant for all categories although its sign is always posi-
tive and relatively large in magnitude, which suggests that exit probability increases with growth.
Income and nonwhite population do not have highly signi¯cant coe±cients, the only important ex-
ception is the signi¯cant and large increase in exit probability for chains where a larger fraction of
the population is nonwhite. While wage does not seem to in°uence the exit probability for chains,
19Probit and some asymmetric speci¯cations of the distribution did not yield substantially di®erent results.
20A small number of establishments that enterd during 1998 were active only for part of the year and exited before
the end of the year. For such establishments, age is set to zero, and the logarithm is not applicable.
24it does so signi¯cantly in the case of stand-alone stores. Exit probability is lower in high wage cities,
especially for diversi¯ed stores. The relative unimportance of the wage for specialized stores' exit
rate is again consistent with the predictions of the competitive theory. Finally, the impact of rent
on the exit probability is also diverse for di®erent categories. While rent is positively associated
with exit probability for stand-alone stores, it is negatively associated for chains. The latter e®ect
is much more signi¯cant and higher in magnitude. If one views rent as a crude proxy for ¯xed costs
and/or entry costs, the pattern for stand-alone stores is consistent with the competitive theory.
The impression from the analysis in this section is that the exit patterns for di®erent categories
di®er in important ways. The results are broadly in line with the competitive theory for stand-alone
stores, more so for specialized ones, but the chains' behavior is substantially di®erent.
5.3 Entry
Unlike in the case of exit, the set of potential entrants is not observable, hence an establishment level
logit analysis is not applicable. Nevertheless, the analysis proceeds here with a simple speci¯cation:
the number of potential entrants is proportional to the number of incumbent establishments in the
market. This is the general approach in the entry and exit literature (see Dunne, Roberts, and
Samuelson (1988)). It is assumed that the number of type j establishments that enter a city c with
a total of Nj type j incumbent establishments, Ej
c; follows a Poisson process conditional on a vector
of market characteristics, xc: That is,
P(E
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where the error term "j
c is assumed to be independent across cities. The exponential formulation
ensures the non-negativity of the entry rate. The model is straightforward to estimate by maximum
likelihood methods.
Limitations of the Poisson speci¯cation is well-known. The fact that the mean equals variance
may lead to arti¯cially low standard errors for the parameter estimates. To address this concern,
the tests for the Poisson ¯t were constructed based on Cameron and Trivedi (1986). For all the
estimations to follow in the rest of this section, the tests consistently failed to reject the Poisson
speci¯cation for the data against more °exible speci¯cations such as Negative Binomial distribution.
25The market characteristics and the industry structure variables used here are the same as in the
exit analysis. The estimated coe±cients are given in Table 13. Overall, as in the case of exit, the
entry rate declines with market size, although the coe±cient is signi¯cant only at 5% level. This
e®ect is largely driven by chains. The entry rate for stand-alone stores is also negatively associated
with market size, but the coe±cient is not highly signi¯cant. The impact seems to be stronger for
specialized stores, but not for diversi¯ed stores. This pattern for market size's impact appears to
be consistent with the competitive theory for stand-alone stores, but not for chains. It looks like
the entry rate of chains falls signi¯cantly as markets get larger.
Growth in market size seems to increase entry for all categories, but the coe±cients are signi¯cant
only for diversi¯ed stores, and, as a result, for stand-alone stores. Entry is not highly responsive to
population growth in chains and specialized stores. Together with the positive association between
exit and growth, this result suggests that markets experiencing growth tend to have higher turnover.
It should be noted, though, the growth is measured only for one year, and long run growth e®ects
may be di®erent from what is observed here. As in the case of exit, nonwhite population and income
do not turn out to have highly signi¯cant impact on entry. In particular, chains' entry rate tend
to decline with nonwhite population, but increase with income, and a weak relation is observed
between stand-alone stores' entry rate and these variables.
Higher wages have a negative, but insigni¯cant, impact on entry overall. This e®ect is linked
primarily to specialized stores' entry rate, which declines signi¯cantly with wage. Chains' entry rate
is positively associated with wages, but this e®ect is again not signi¯cant. In the case of diversi¯ed
stores, entry also decreases with wages, but not signi¯cantly. Entry rate is also negatively related to
rent overall. While for stand-alone stores rent has a positive but insigni¯cant impact on entry rate,
chains' entry rate decline signi¯cantly with rent and the magnitude of this decline is relatively high.
Together with rent's negative impact on exit rate, this suggests that chains' turnover is much lower
in high rent cities. Note also that, in general, the impact of rent on entry for chain, specialized,
and diversi¯ed stores tends to be larger in magnitude than in the case of exit.
As in the static analysis, the sensitivity of the results to inclusion of additional regressors were
checked. The ¯ndings on the impact of market size on entry and exit rates were not a®ected
substantially.
Viewed together, the analysis on entry and exit reveal important di®erences in the turnover
patterns of di®erent establishment categories across markets. While stand-alone stores tend to
exhibit a turnover pattern that is broadly consistent with the competitive industry theory, the
chains' turnover does not seem to fall within the same framework.
26Reconciling the ¯ndings on the static and dynamic patterns, the industry seems to behave in
the lines of the oligopoly-competitive fringe framework. It would be too optimistic, though, to
claim that what is observed here exactly coincides with the model presented. There are many gaps
that need to be ¯lled in, such as clear predictions regarding the impact of market characteristics on
the dynamics of the oligopoly-competitive fringe model, and for imperfect competition models, in
general.
It is also important to somehow quantify the degree of interaction between the oligopoly and
the fringe. In particular, if the products o®ered by the fringe and the oligopoly are su±ciently
di®erentiated so that the demand linkage between the two sectors is broken, we might just as well
be looking at two totally separate industries, one behaving oligopolistically, the other competitively.
Further work is required to identify how the di®erent segments interact with each other, possibly
by analyzing how changes in prices or sales in one sector responds to those in other sectors. Nev-
ertheless, the patterns presented here indicate a clear separation of activity across di®erent sectors
of the market.
6 Conclusion
Empirical work describing the nature of spatial competition in retail markets is still in its infancy.
This paper has taken a mostly descriptive step by analyzing the static organization and dynamics
across markets of an important retail sector. The evidence presented in this paper suggests that it
is essential to recognize heterogeneity of establishments within a market to understand how markets
are organized. Indeed, di®erent establishment groups seem to exhibit surprisingly di®erent static
and dynamic behavior across markets, and the interaction among these groups determine the overall
dynamics of the market.
The patterns found here suggest a view of local markets where dominant establishments consist-
ing of chains and a fringe composed of stand-alone stores interact. While the static organization of
the former group is inconsistent with that of a competitive industry, the latter group behaves like
one. It is likely that this type of interaction is not limited to the particular industry studied here,
but may apply to some other retail markets as well.
On the theoretical side, the ¯ndings call for the development of industry dynamics models that
will allow us to analyze the interaction between dominant ¯rms and a competitive fringe as one
potentially representative model for some retail sectors. In particular, incorporation of entry, exit
and location choice in such models are important and challenging avenues of future research.
27The extension of the dynamic analysis to several periods will enhance the analysis. Time series
aspects, such as the response of the markets to entry, can be analyzed. Also, questions that are
important from a policy and welfare point of view, such as whether there is a continuing trend
towards the sweep of stand-alone stores from the market, can be addressed.
Finally, the results in this paper are by no means representative of the retail sector as a whole
and future work extending the analysis here to other industries is required. While availability of
data seems to be a serious impediment to such work, a comprehensive database on entry and exit
patterns of several retail industries is currently being developed by the U.S. Census Bureau and will
allow for a more aggregate look at the turnover patterns as in Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson's
(1988) study of manufacturing industries.
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30Variable Description
CHAIN Dummy variable for an establishment that is part of a local or
national chain.
STAND-ALONE Dummy variable for an establishment that is not part of a chain.
DIVERSIFIED Dummy variable for a stand-alone establishment that o®ers
multiple products including alcoholic beverages.
SPECIALIZED Dummy variable for a stand-alone establishment that is
specialized in alcohol retail.
AGE Number of years an establishment has been in alcohol retail business.
Table 1. Description of establishment speci¯c variables
31Variable Description Source
POPULATION Population estimate, beginning of 1998 CSA
POPGRO Population growth during 1998 CSA
INCOME Median family income in 1990 CCDB
NONWHITE Percent in 1990 of population that is nonwhite CCDB
AGE21O Percent in 1990 of population older than 21 years (drinking age) CCDB
WAGE County average wage in liquor stores in 1996 CBP
RENT Median rent in renter occupied housing units in 1990 CCDB
Notes: CSA stands for California Statistical Abstract issued by California Department of Finance.
CCDB and CBP stand for County and City Databook and County Business Patterns, respectively,
and both are issued by U.S. Bureau of the Census.
Table 2. Variables describing city characteristics
32.
Variable Unit Mean Std. Min Max
POPULATION 108,893 275,330 18,100 3,716,000
POPGRO % 1.7 1.2 -1.6 7.1
INCOME $ 44,425 13,500 23,262 95,602
NONWHITE % 28 17 3 89
AGE21O % 69 6 53 91
WAGE $ 12,050 3,140 5,110 21,530
RENT $ 674 144 391 1,001
Notes: INCOME and RENT are in 1990 dollars, and WAGE is in 1996 dollars.
Table 3. Descriptive statistics for city characteristics
Variable POPGRO INCOME NONWHITE AGE21O WAGE RENT
POPULATION 0.03 -0.09 0.21 -0.05 -0.06 -0.08
POP*AGE21O 0.02 -0.03 0.16 0.06 -0.02 -0.03
POPGRO 1.00 0.05 -0.11 -0.08 -0.24 0.02
INCOME 1.00 -0.49 0.54 0.39 0.84
NONWHITE 1.00 -0.48 -0.06 -0.25
AGE21O 1.00 0.28 0.42
WAGE 1.00 0.46
RENT 1.00
Notes: In correlations, POPULATION, POP*AGE21O, INCOME, RENT and WAGE are in logs
because they enter the regressions in logs. POPGRO is the percent growth in population during
1998.
Table 4. Correlations between city characteristics
33Statewide Across Cities
Type Mean Mean Std. Min Max
CHAIN 0.32 0.38 0.14 0.07 0.84
STAND-ALONE 0.68 0.62 0.14 0.16 0.93
DIVERSIFIED 0.22 0.19 0.11 0.00 0.57
SPECIALIZED 0.46 0.42 0.13 0.04 0.82
Table 5. Share of total establishments by establishment type
34Dependent Variable: Share of total establishments
Independent Variable CHAIN STAND-ALONE DIVERSIFIED SPECIALIZED
CONSTANT -1.197 0.262 -1.184 0.090
(0.00) (0.45) (0.37) (0.37)
POP*AGE21O -0.039 0.031 -0.003 0.028
(0.01) (0.07) (0.95) (0.32)
NONWHITE -0.308 0.147 0.044 0.224
(0.00) (0.00) (0.79) (0.01)
INCOME 0.412 -0.229 0.315 -0.538
(0.08) (0.03) (0.41) (0.02)
WAGE -0.057 0.046 0.663 -0.239
(0.62) (0.49) (0.00) (0.07)
RENT -0.227 0.075 -1.320 0.996
(0.35) (0.52) (0.00) (0.00)
N 218 218 203 218
R2 0.28 0.22 0.12 0.18
Prob > F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: Dependent variables are in logs. Heteroskedasticity-consistent t-distribution signi¯cance
levels are in parantheses.
Table 6. OLS regression results for establishment composition across cities
35Dependent Variable: Establishments per capita
Independent Variable Overall CHAIN STAND-ALONE DIVERSIFIED SPECIALIZED
CONSTANT -0.829 -1.377 -0.194 -1.323 -0.199
(0.04) (0.05) (0.79) (0.29) (0.82)
POP*AGE21O -0.024 -0.107 0.033 0.007 0.032
(0.04) (0.01) (0.43) (0.91) (0.56)
NONWHITE -0.095 -0.482 0.069 -0.259 0.050
(0.12) (0.00) (0.45) (0.12) (0.73)
INCOME -0.624 -0.043 -0.842 -0.645 -0.973
(0.00) (0.85) (0.01) (0.14) (0.00)
WAGE 0.084 -0.109 0.036 0.731 -0.224
(0.33) (0.48) (0.80) (0.00) (0.29)
RENT -0.105 -0.360 0.111 -0.922 0.652
(0.53) (0.23) (0.78) (0.04) (0.14)
N 218 218 218 203 218
R2 0.31 0.22 0.29 0.21 0.21
Prob > F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Breusch ¡Pagan Stat: 236.72 Prob > Â2 0.00
Joint significance of 3.03 Prob > Â2 0.01
POP*AGE21O coef:
Notes: Dependent variables are in logs. Establishments per capita is the number of establishments
per drinking age person. Heteroskedasticity-consistent t-distribution signi¯cance levels are in
parantheses. The last two rows report the Breusch-Pagan test statistic for independence of
residuals across regressions and joint test for the signi¯cance of population. Both tests have an
asymptotic Â2 distribution.
Table 7. OLS regression results for establishments per capita across cities
36Entry Rate Exit Rate Comparison of Means
Type Mean Std. Mean Std. t ¡ stat Prob > jtj
CHAIN 0.048 0.081 0.063 0.079 -2.53 0.01
STAND-ALONE 0.125 0.097 0.149 0.103 -4.03 0.00
DIVERSIFIED 0.156 0.082 0.105 0.092 3.05 0.00
SPECIALIZED 0.109 0.100 0.164 0.061 -4.88 0.00
Notes: Reported statistics are calculated using time averages for each city
over the years 1995-1998. Comparison of mean entry and exit rates across
cities for each category is based on a two-sided paired t-test.
Table 8. Entry and exit rates by type across cities
37Entry Rate
Type STAND-ALONE DIVERSIFIED SPECIALIZED
CHAIN -0.083 0.033 -0.113
DIVERSIFIED 1.000 0.054
Notes: All correlations are averages over the years 1995-1998.
Table 9. Correlation of entry rates across cities
Exit Rate
Type STAND-ALONE DIVERSIFIED SPECIALIZED
CHAIN -0.057 0.060 -0.090
DIVERSIFIED 1.000 0.156
Notes: All correlations are averages over the years 1995-1998.
Table 10. Correlation of exit rates across cities
Entry Rate ¡!
Exit Rate # STAND-ALONE CHAIN DIVERSIFIED SPECIALIZED
STAND-ALONE 0.637 -0.008 0.437 0.518
CHAIN -0.010 0.430 0.074 -0.092
DIVERSIFIED 0.277 -0.044 0.377 0.114
SPECIALIZED 0.573 0.014 0.335 0.539
Notes: All correlations are averages over the years 1995-1998.
Table 11. Correlations of entry rates with exit rates across cities
38Dependent Variable: Exit Indicator, X
j
ic
Variable Overall CHAIN STAND-ALONE DIVERSIFIED SPECIALIZED
CONSTANT -0.615 1.619 -1.209 2.446 -1.891
(0.73) (0.66) (0.56) (0.57) (0.39)
DIVERSIFIED 0.275 - - - -
(0.00)
SPECIALIZED 1.127 - - - -
(0.00)
AGE -0.029 -0.013 -0.029 -0.024 -0.037
(0.00) (0.43) (0.00) (0.15) (0.00)
POP*AGE21O -0.099 -0.129 -0.098 -0.248 -0.043
(0.04) (0.01) (0.09) (0.07) (0.43)
POPGRO 4.341 8.542 2.940 0.778 3.920
(0.25) (0.14) (0.49) (0.92) (0.38)
NONWHITE 0.333 1.160 0.261 0.172 0.229
(0.19) (0.03) (0.34) (0.79) (0.47)
INCOME 0.036 1.489 -0.509 -0.615 -0.233
(0.95) (0.34) (0.47) (0.67) (0.77)
WAGE -0.569 -0.252 -1.115 -2.564 0.244
(0.20) (0.81) (0.02) (0.02) (0.70)
RENT -0.338 -3.758 1.315 0.802 0.582
(0.66) (0.03) (0.11) (0.67) (0.50)
N 9313 2931 6382 2076 4306
Log ¡ likelihood -3521 -746 -2824 -641 -2118
Prob > Â2 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: White's (1982) robust signi¯cance levels in parantheses. The omitted category in the
¯rst column is CHAIN.
Table 12. Logit analysis of exit probability by establishment type
39Dependent Variable: Number of Entrants, Ej
c
Variable Overall CHAIN STAND-ALONE DIVERSIFIED SPECIALIZED
CONSTANT 0.288 7.514 -2.098 -2.313 -1.869
(0.87) (0.10) (0.31) (0.45) (0.50)
POP*AGE21O -0.059 -0.179 -0.102 0.036 -0.120
(0.05) (0.01) (0.12) (0.21) (0.10)
POPGRO 4.845 2.582 7.670 11.556 4.347
(0.19) (0.72) (0.04) (0.03) (0.42)
NONWHITE 0.201 -0.200 0.072 -0.069 0.248
(0.45) (0.78) (0.80) (0.87) (0.52)
INCOME 0.113 1.446 0.088 -0.361 -0.145
(0.87) (0.40) (0.90) (0.75) (0.88)
WAGE -0.278 0.768 -0.753 -0.794 -1.689
(0.52) (0.44) (0.08) (0.21) (0.02)
RENT -0.933 -6.113 0.301 1.007 1.078
(0.23) (0.00) (0.73) (0.44) (0.36)
N 218 218 218 218 218
Log ¡ likelihood -405 -201 -381 -291 -302
Prob > Â2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: Standard normal signi¯cance levels in parantheses.









Figure 1: Establishment classi¯cation schemeFigure 2: Establishments per capita vs. population: Simulations from the Cournot oligopoly -
competitive fringe model (Population range: S = 10 to 100;000 and the lowest type consumer's
marginal utility: ® = 0:001)Figure 3: Establishments per capita vs. county population in California o®-sale general alcoholic
beverages industry, 1998. (For the non-parametric estimate, a Gaussiankernel was used withan optimally
chosen plug-in bandwidth of h = cn¡1=5 where c = 1:5 and n is the sample size.)Figure 4: Establishments per capita vs. city population in California o®-sale general alcoholic
beverages industry, 1998. (For the non-parametric estimate, a Gaussiankernel was used withan optimally
chosen plug-in bandwidth of h = cn¡1=5 where c = 1:5 and n is the sample size.)Figure 5: Establishments per capita vs. city population in California o®-sale general alcoholic
beverages industry, 1998: cities with population greater than 25,000 (For the non-parametric estimate,
a Gaussian kernel was used with an optimally chosen plug-in bandwidth of h = cn¡1=5 where c = 1:5 and
n is the sample size.)Figure 6: Statewide entry and exit rates during 1995-1998